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MORE SENSE THAN MONEY: NATIONAL CHARTER OPTION FOR 
FINTECH FIRMS IS THE RIGHT CHOICE 
J. Parker Murphy* 
The financial technology field is a rapidly growing sector that 
threatens to disrupt established financial institutions and their 
accompanying regulatory structure. New types of financial 
services and products do not fit neatly into the current regulatory 
landscape, which has hampered growth and competition with 
traditional financial institutions. This article advances the idea 
that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s recently 
proposed special purpose national bank charter provides an 
appropriate solution that protects consumers, encourages 
innovation and competition, and moves the industry forward. First, 
this article briefly describes the financial technology sector and 
the scheme of national bank regulation. Second, the proposed 
charter is put in context, examining the state and national 
regulatory schemes currently monitoring the financial technology 
industry. Lastly, this article evaluates the potential impact of a 
special purpose national bank charter on consumers, regulatory 
bodies, and financial technology companies themselves. 
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When attempting to explain the explosive growth of the 
financial technology sector (“fintech”), it is an understatement to 
say that the industry has hit record highs in the past six months, 
year, or even three years. Rather, fintech growth has been 
astronomical and has consistently set and broken growth records, 
despite a slowdown in billion-dollar mega-deals for 2016.1  In 
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2014, investment in the industry tripled over the previous year to a 
stunning $12 billion.2 Another evaluation showed that industry 
investment grew from $17.8 billion to more than $38 billion 
between 2014 and 2015.3 While it may be impossible to count the 
exact number of fintech firms, Forbes notes that different estimates 
put the number between 5,000 and 6,000 firms.4 Another reason it 
can be so hard to quantify fintech’s explosive growth is due to the 
diversity of industries encompassed by fintech. 5  Crypto-
currencies, 6  blockchain, 7  security, banking and payments, and 
                                                                                                         
to thank Prof. Lissa Broome for her invaluable recommendations and 
suggestions. 
1  Julia Verhage, Trouble Brewing for Private Companies?, BLOOMBERG 
MARKETS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-
16/private-funding-for-fintech-firms-has-taken-a-tumble. 
 2 Call Levels, The State of Fintech Industry as We Know It Infographic, 
FINTECH FINANCE (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.fintech.finance/01-news/the-state-
of-fintech-industry-as-we-know-it-infographic/. 
 3  Jean Baptiste Su, The Global Fintech Landscape Reaches over 1000 




 4 Falguin Desai, Fintech Startups Face Difficult Market Ahead, FORBES (Jan. 
4, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/falgunidesai/2016/01/04/fintech-startups-
face-difficult-market-ahead/#48d614e13145. 
 5 Larry D. Wall, Avoiding Regulation: FinTech versus the Sharing Economy, 
FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA (Sept. 2016), 
https://frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/09-avoiding-
regulation-fintech-versus-the-sharing-economy-2016-09-29. “Financial 
technology companies are generally startups founded with the purpose of 
disrupting incumbent financial systems and corporations that rely less on 
software.” (citing Fintech Definition, FINTECH WEEKLY, 
https://www.fintechweekly.com/fintech-definition (last visited Apr. 4, 2017)). 
 6 Crypto-currency can be defined as “a currency underpinned by technological 
surety as opposed to a central bank.” Robert Churcher & Louise Perfect, A 
Beginner’s Guide to FinTech: Navigating the Jargon, PWC (May 11, 2016), 
http://pwc.blogs.com/megatrend_matters/2016/05/a-beginners-guide-to-fintech-
navigating-the-jargon.html. 
 7 “Blockchain, generally speaking, is used to create public ledgers of 
transactions and distribute them in a decentralized manner to several computers, 
making it just about impossible to hack and change all the recorded versions of 
the data.” Natalie Rodriguez, An Inside Look At A Law Firm Diving Into Bitcoin 
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insurance are just a few8 of the categories that make up the fintech 
landscape. 9  Several popular companies, such as Square, 
LendingClub, and Social Finance, Inc. (“SoFi”) are all valued 
above $6 billion.10 By some measures, Paypal (which owns the 
popular peer-to-peer payment 11  company Venmo) holds more 
customer deposits than all but twenty U.S. banks.12 
The growth of this industry, combined with the large amount of 
consumer funds that some fintech companies hold, has raised 
                                                                                                         
Tech, LAW360 (March 10, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/769691/an-
inside-look-at-a-law-firm-diving-into-bitcoin-tech. Blockchain is the underlying 
technology for crypto-currencies, as well as smart contracts “that can 
automatically execute payments upon validating ownership information or 
recognizing a trigger event using online information.” Id. For a more detailed 
explanation of bitcoin and blockchain technology, see Marco Santori et al., How 
Blockchain Will Revolutionize Commercial Transactions, LAW360 (May, 12, 
1016), https://www.law360.com/articles/794611/how-blockchain-will-
revolutionize-commercial-transactions. 
 8 For a broader view of the different sub-sectors that make up FinTech, as well 
as an overview of the disruptive impact of FinTech on the financial services 
industry as a whole, see generally Blurred Lines: How FinTech is Shaping 
Financial Services, PWC (Mar. 2016), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/advisory-
services/FinTech/pwc-fintech-global-report.pdf. 
 9 Su, supra note 3. 
 10 Call Levels, supra note 2. SoFi has recently partnered with the ABA to 
market directly to law students who may have an interest in refinancing their 
loans, touting their loan volume of $13B+ for over 200,000 borrowers. See SoFi 






ancing (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
 11 Peer to peer payment services allow individuals to send each other money 
“from their mobile devices through a linked debit card” or bank account. Those 
funds are then stored in an account that can disperse funds to other individuals 
or banks. See generally Amber Murkakami-Fester, Venmo, PayPal, Square 
Cash and More: What Are Peer-to-Peer Payments?, NERDWALLET (Oct. 21, 
2016), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/banking/p2p-payment-systems/. 
 12 Telis Demos, PayPal Isn’t a Bank, But It May Be the New Face of Banking, 
WALL STREET J. (June 1, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-banking-
evolves-fintech-emerges-from-the-branch-1464806411. 
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concerns. Particularly, money held by many of these firms is not 
protected or backstopped13 by the federal government’s deposit 
insurance, as only banks can hold deposits.14 This potential risk to 
consumers, combined with an increase in the number of bank-like 
activities, has led various governmental agencies in the U.S. to 
address concerns about instability in the financial system and the 
insecurity of consumer funds. Recently, the White House under 
President Obama published a white paper entitled “A Framework 
for Fintech,” 15  outlining “widely-shared values and practical 
expectations for the financial services sector . . . .”16 The ten 
enumerated principles focused on consumers, maximizing 
transparency, promoting financial inclusion and health, and 
protecting financial stability. 17  Similarly, the federal banking 
regulator of nationally chartered banks, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), announced it would 
consider issuing formal bank charters to online lenders, payment 
                                                
 13 “The FDIC was created by the Banking Act of 1933, commonly referred to 
as the Glass-Steagall Act, to maintain public confidence in the banking system 
by, among other things, insuring bank deposits within a specified limit.” Paul T. 
Clark, Just Passing Through: A History and Critical Analysis of FDIC 
Insurance of Deposits Held by Brokers and Other Custodians, 32 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 99, 100 (2012–2013). “Deposit insurance is intended to 
instill confidence in depositors by assuring them that their deposits are safe 
regardless of the financial condition of their bank.” Id. at 168. 
 14 See generally Demos, supra note 12. 




President Obama’s directives in this area may have signaled one approach, 
President Trump’s new administration will be able to pick the next Comptroller 
of Currency, and may decide to take a wholly different approach to fintech 
companies. See Trump’s Chance to Redefine the Regulators, WALL STREET J. 
(Jan. 18, 2017), http://graphics.wsj.com/Who-are-the-financial-
regulators/?mod=e2tw. 
 16 Id. 
 17Id. While these principles are subject to change with a new incoming 
President, the white paper provides an outline of the potential considerations the 
federal government faces when attempting to deal with the growing and 
disruptive industry. 
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companies, and other fintech firms.18 This special purpose national 
bank charter (previously used to authorize credit card banks)19 
would require any firms who elected to seek a charter to conform 
to a formal system of federal regulation, instead of having to 
comply with a patchwork of state regulation by partnering with 
chartered financial institutions.20 
While some commenters argue that government regulation will 
only create uncertainty in a growing industry,21 fintech companies, 
like Circle Internet Financial,22 have requested increased regulation 
and security in order to increase the ease of doing business 
nationally due to uniformity of laws and regulations.23 Fintech 
companies will continue to reduce costs associated with 
borrowing, improve the quality of financial services, harness the 
                                                
 18 James Rufus Koren, ‘Fintech’ Firms Notch Win as Regulator Allows Them 
to Seek Federal Bank Charters, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fintech-charters-20161202-story.html. 
 19 Credit card banks are national banks limited to the issuance of credit cards 
to customers. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING 
SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES (Dec. 
2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/bank-
operations/innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-
fintech.pdf [hereinafter Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for 
Fintech Companies]. 
 20  Rachel Witkowski & Telis Demos, Fintech Startup Craves More 
Regulation, WALL STREET J. (June 9, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fintech-startup-craves-more-regulation-
1465517775. Currently, many companies are forced to rely on relationships with 
currently chartered banks or engage in state-by-state compliance in order to 
issue loans. Id. 
 21 Rohit Arora, Government Should Think Before Imposing Regulation on 
Fintech, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 2, 2015), 
https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/02/government-should-think-before-imposing-
heavy-regulation-on-fintech/ (arguing regulators should create clarity, not more 
regulation, in order to lower the cost of administering critical credit for 
underserved markets and increase transparency). 
 22 Circle Internet Financial, or simply “Circle,” is a payments processing 
company that uses open Internet standards and protocols (including blockchain) 
to make “online payments easier to use, safer and more convenient than ever.” 
About, CIRCLE INTERNET FINANCIAL LIMITED, https://www.circle.com/en/about 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 23 Witkowski & Demos, supra note 20. 
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power of data-driven analytics for assessing risk, and create a more 
diverse and stable credit landscape. 24  Additionally, the OCC 
believes that fintech companies will continue to drive changes in 
financial services to “reach unbanked and underserved populations, 
[and] make products and services safer and more efficient . . . .”25 
These improvements will likely continue regardless of a charter 
offering for fintech firms, and consumers and small business 
owners across the country stand to benefit from a new age in 
banking that is more accessible and inclusive than ever. 
This Recent Development argues that a special purpose bank 
charter would benefit both consumers and the financial services 
industry by subjecting larger fintech companies to increased 
scrutiny and regulation. A more cohesive scheme of regulations 
would create improved transparency, competition, and consumer 
protection, while reducing the limiting effect of the current state-
by-state regulatory scheme on fintech companies. Part II of this 
recent development provides a brief overview of the scheme of 
national bank regulation, including the role of the OCC, the value 
of special purpose bank charters, and the OCC’s statutory authority 
for creating new bank charters. Part III examines the costs and 
benefits of current regulation of the fintech industry, focusing on 
institutions that specialize in lending or other activities that often 
attract increased regulatory scrutiny. Lastly, Part IV evaluates the 
potential of a specified bank charter for fintech firms, including the 
benefits and risks that would accompany it. Despite concerns 
leveled by state banks and other institutions that would be 
adversely impacted by a charter for fintech firms, such a charter 
would provide better management of the unique risks present in the 
industry, increase transparency, and better protect consumers while 
                                                
 24 The Fintech Revolution: A Wave of Startups is Changing Finance for the 
Better, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21650546-wave-startups-changing-
financefor-better-fintech-revolution. 
 25 Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Remarks Regarding Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech 
Companies, at 2 (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2016/pub-speech-2016-152.pdf. 
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also providing enhanced services for consumers and small business 
owners. 
II. EXPLANATION OF THE FEDERAL BANK REGULATORY 
SYSTEM AND THE OCC 
The federal government provides regulatory oversight for the 
banking and securities markets of the United States in order to 
protect borrowers and investors that participate in those markets.26 
Financial regulation is designed to mitigate financial instability 
through the promulgation of rules for specific types of institutions 
and behaviors.27 The responsibility of overseeing major financial 
institutions like banks is divided amongst several federal agencies 
whose duties sometimes overlap with state level regulatory 
authority. The parallel federal and state banking systems that co-
exist in the United States give potential banks the option of 
chartering under federal law and regulation, or state law and 
regulation. 28  Both banking systems provide “different, positive 
contributions to the overall strength of the U.S. banking system.”29 
This section will provide a brief overview of the federal regulatory 
scheme, the structure of special purpose banks, and how financial 
technology companies would fit into the federal regulatory scheme 
under a special purpose charter. 
A. Outline of the Federal Bank Regulatory System 
The OCC currently serves as the primary federal regulator for 
national banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches 
                                                
 26 EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43087, WHO REGULATES 
WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICY FOR 
BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS (2015), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43087.pdf. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NATIONAL 
BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM, (Sept. 2003), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-
reports/national-banks-and-the-dual-banking-system.pdf [hereinafter National 
Banks and the Dual Banking System]. 
 29 Id. 
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of foreign banks30 and has the power to grant charters for those 
companies under the National Bank Act31 and Home Owners’ Loan 
Act.32 Banks that elect state charters are regulated by their state-
level regulator and also by a federal regulator: either the Federal 
Reserve Board (“FRB”) for state banks that are members of the 
Federal Reserve System, or Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) for state non-member banks. 33  The OCC conducts 
examinations by analyzing loan and investment portfolios, capital, 
assets, funds management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to 
market risk. 34  Additionally, the OCC can take supervisory 
enforcement action against any bank it supervises that does not 
comply with the law or regulations issued by the OCC in the form 
of monetary penalties or required remedial actions.35 
The OCC has the power to grant charters for national banks 
under the National Bank Act,36 and will approve charter proposals 
that “will provide fair access to financial services; will ensure 
compliance with laws and regulations; will promote fair treatment 
                                                
 30  About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
https://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2017) [hereinafter About the OCC]. 
 31 See 12 U.S.C. § 38 (2012). 
 32 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1461 (2012). The OCC also has authority, under the 
International Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3102, to license a foreign bank to 
operate a federal branch or agency in the United States. See Exploring Special 
Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies, supra note 19. 
 33 See generally Who Regulates My Bank?, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF 
THE CURRENCY, https://www.helpwithmybank.gov/national-banks/national-
banks.html, (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Who Regulates My Bank?]. 
 34 About the OCC, supra note 30. 
 35 Enforcement Actions, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
https://www.occ.gov/topics/laws-regulations/enforcement-actions/index-
enforcement-actions.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Enforcement 
Actions]; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818 (2012) (Cease and Desist 
Orders), 1818(i)(2) (Civil Money Penalty Orders), 1831o (2012) (Prompt 
Corrective Action Directives). 
 36  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S 
LICENSING MANUAL: CHARTERS 50 (2016), 
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-
manuals/charters.pdf [hereinafter Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters]. 
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of customers; and will foster healthy competition.”37 The OCC 
considers whether the proposed bank has competent management, 
sufficient capital, will be operated in a safe and sounds manner, 
poses acceptable risk to the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund, and 
demonstrates that its corporate powers are consistent with the 
purposes of federal savings associations,38 federal savings banks,39 
or national banks.40 The OCC has stated that “the business of 
banking develops over time as the economy and business methods 
evolve,”41 and also has the authority to determine what activities 
are permissible for national banks.42 Specifically, the OCC believes 
that it “has the legal authority to construe these activities to include 
bank-permissible, technology-based innovations in financial 
services.”43 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United 
States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system. . . .” 44 The Act implemented changes affecting 
the oversight and supervision of financial institutions, created the 
                                                
 37 Id. 
 38 See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e), (f) (2017) (outlining factors the OCC considers 
when reviewing a charter application). 
 41 Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies, 
supra note 19. 
 42 See generally NationsBank of N.C., v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 
U.S. 251 (1995); M&M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat’l Bank, 563 F.2d 
1377 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 987 (1978); OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC CONDITIONAL APPROVAL NO. 267 
(January 12, 1998), https://www.occ.gov/static/bit/ca267.pdf (certification 
authority and repository and key escrow are part of the business of banking); 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC INTERPRETIVE LETTER 
NO. 494 (Dec. 20, 1989) (allowing national banks to purchase and sell financial 
futures for their own account). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010). 
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”),45 provided for a 
new resolution procedure for large financial companies, and 
reformed the regulation of credit rating agencies.46 While many of 
the changes made by Dodd-Frank did not directly affect special 
purpose charters or financial technology companies, the Act 
signaled a renewed focus on protecting the stability of the financial 
system and ensured that large institutions or new products could 
not have a destabilizing effect on the economy. 47  Increased 
concerns about stability may cause some regulators in the financial 
services industry to see new, untested products or financial entities 
as a risk to that stability, especially if they could affect the 
financial industry on a national level.48 This perspective could 
generate opposition to the potential entry of fintech companies into 
the federal banking system. However, the former chief counsel of 
the OCC believed that current institutions will recognize the value 
of competition, and “balance their support for technical 
innovation” with “safety-and-soundness-based caution.”49 
                                                
 45 The CFPB is a federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing 
compliance with consumer finance laws. See The Bureau, CONSUMER FINANCE 
PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/ 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
 46 The Dodd-Frank Act: A Cheat Sheet, MORRISON & FOERSTER (2010), 
http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/SummaryDoddFrankAct.pdf. 
 47 Federal Reserve Board Chair Janet Yellen recently remarked, “Dodd-Frank 
placed considerable emphasis on financial stability . . . ”  and also affirmed that 
the recent financial crisis has led to a higher priority on safeguards and 
supervisions that result in a “ . . . safer and sounder financial system.” Amanda 
Schiavo, Fed Chari Yellen Why Banks Need Dodd-Frank, THE STREET (Nov. 17, 
2016), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13898085/1/fed-chair-janet-yellen-i-
think-dodd-frank-was-very-important.html. 
 48  See, e.g., Szu Ping Chan, Fintech ‘Boom’ Risks Fresh ‘Bust’ If Left 
Unchecked, Warns Carney, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 25, 2017), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/01/25/fintech-boom-risks-fresh-bust-
left-unchecked-warns-carney/ (arguing global regulators should monitor 
developments in fintech closely to avoid boom and bust cycles). 
 49 Gregory Roberts, Ex-OCC Counsel Predicts Caution From Regulators on 
Fintech, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 9, 2016), https://www.bna.com/exocc-
counsel-predicts-n57982073852/. Julie Williams served as chief counsel for the 
OCC for nineteen years before leaving in 2012, and later joined Promontory 
Financial Group in Washington, DC. Id. 
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B. Special Purpose National Banks 
The OCC also offers a separate special purpose bank charter. 
Special purpose banks “must engage in fiduciary activities or 
provide at least one of following banking services: receiving 
deposits; paying checks; or lending money.”50 On March 15, 2017, 
the OCC issued a document entitled “A Draft Licensing Manual 
Supplement for Evaluating Charter Applications from Financial 
Technology Companies.”51 In an explanation of the document, the 
OCC stated that it anticipates that special purpose national banks 
will “elect to demonstrate that they are engaged in paying checks 
or lending money.”52 Additionally, the OCC noted, “issuing debit 
cards or engaging in other means of facilitating payments 
electronically may be considered the modern equivalent of paying 
checks.”53 
Traditionally the special purpose bank, while bound by many 
of the same restrictions on standard national bank charters, “may 
offer only a small number of products, target a limited customer 
base, incorporate nontraditional elements, or have narrowly 
targeted business plans.”54 Whereas national banks are generally 
authorized by their articles of associations or charters to exercise 
all express or implied powers of their respective charter, the OCC 
may require a business seeking a special purpose charter to specify 
                                                
 50 Michael Nonaka, OCC to Issue Special Purpose National Bank Charters to 
Fintech Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REGULATION (Dec. 11, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/11/occ-
to-issue-special-purpose-national-bank-charters-to-fintech-companies/. See also 
12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1) (2014). 
 51 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EVALUATING CHARTER 
APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-
manuals/file-pub-lm-fintech-licensing-manual-supplement.pdf [hereinafter 
Evaluating Charter Applications from Financial Technology Companies]. 
 52 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC SUMMARY OF 
COMMENTS AND EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL 
BANK CHARTERS FOR FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/summary-explanatory-
statement-fintech-charters.pdf. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36. 
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in more detail the activities in which it plans to be engaged.55 
Businesses that are granted special purpose charters are not 
permitted to deviate from those activities without prior OCC 
approval.56 
Fintech firms may be subject to other federal laws including 
the Bank Secrecy Act,57 Electronic Funds Transfer Act,58 Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act,59 Equal Credit Opportunity Act,60 Fair 
Housing Act,61 Fair Credit Reporting Act,62 Truth in Lending Act,63 
and any economic sanctions levied by the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control.64 Fintech firms that obtain a special purpose national bank 
charter from the OCC would be subject to laws regarding legal 
lending limits, restrictions on transactions with affiliates, and 
insider-lending requirements.65 Although the OCC Whitepaper66 
doesn’t touch upon it, special purpose national banks are “subject 
to the Change in Bank Control Act, which would require that any 
                                                
 55 David F. Freeman, Jr. et al., OCC Unveils Its Plan to Charter FinTech 
Companies as Special Purpose National Banks, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE 
SCHOLER LLP (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://www.apks.com/en/perspectives/publications/2016/12/occ-unveils-its-plan-
to-charter-fintech. 
 56 Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies, 
supra note 19. 
 57 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5330 (2012); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(s), 1829(b), 1951–
1959; 31 C.F.R. §103 (2014); 31 C.F.R. Chapter X (2014). 
 58 15 U.S.C. § 1693b (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2014). 
 59 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1003 (2014). 
 60 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1002 (2014). 
 61 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 100 (2014). 
 62 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 222 (2014). 
 63 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2014). 
 64 31 C.F.R. Chapter V (2014). 
 65 Lawrence D. Kaplan et al., The OCC’s Proposed Fintech Charter: If It 
Walks Like a Bank and Quacks Like a Bank, It’s a Bank, PAUL HASTINGS (Dec. 
13, 2016) https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-
items/details/?id=2b1eeb69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded#_edn13 (citing 12 
U.S.C. § 84 (2014) and 12 C.F.R. § 32 (2012); 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1(2012) 
and 12 C.F.R. § 223 (2014); and 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a(a)–(b) (2012) and 12 C.F.R. 
§ 215 (2014)). 
 66  See Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech 
Companies, supra note 19. 
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person acquiring control of a Fintech Bank obtain prior OCC 
approval after at least a 60-day public notice and comment 
period.”67 
The most common example of an institution that is chartered 
under a special purpose charter is a credit card bank, which is 
primarily concerned with issuing credit cards and generating credit 
card receivables.68 Credit card banks traditionally engage only in a 
limited amount of activities, and “offer a small number of 
products, target a limited customer case, incorporate nontraditional 
elements, or have narrowly targeted business plans.”69 The Federal 
Reserve Board usually subjects companies that own credit card 
banks to additional supervision and oversight, but there are 
exceptions under the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 
(“CEBA”). 70  Not only must such credit card banks meet 
requirements for creation under the CEBA amendment71 to the 
Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”),72 they must also become 
insured depository institutions73 and apply for membership in the 
Federal Reserve System.74 Furthermore, since credit card banks are 
highly specialized and may pose risks that do not typically occur in 
consumer and commercial banking operations, the OCC may 
impose a number of additional requirements.75 The OCC may also 
                                                
 67 Kaplan et al., supra note 65 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (2012); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 5.50 (2014)). 
 68 Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36 at 51. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id.; see also 12 C.F.R. 225.145 (2017). 
 71 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, PL100-86, Sect. 101, August 
10, 1987, 101 Stat 552. 
 72 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F) (2012). 
 73 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2) (defining insured depository institutions as “any 
bank or savings association the deposits of which are insured by the Corporation 
pursuant to this chapter”). 
 74 Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36; see 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.145 (2017). 
 75 Those requirements can include maintaining a specific minimum capital 
floor, a certain percentage of tier 1 capital (leverage ratio), and developing a 
business contingency plan in case the bank does not achieve original business 
plan results. See Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36; 12 
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require an operating agreement between the special purpose bank 
and the OCC establishing minimum requirements regarding 
capital, liquidity, corporate governance, risk-management, and 
other items.76 
C. Special Purpose Bank Charters for Fintech Companies 
In light of the substantial historical background of special 
purpose banks, the OCC “views the National Bank Act as 
sufficiently adaptable to permit national banks—full-service or 
special purpose—to engage in new activities as part of the business 
of banking or to engage in traditional activities in new ways.”77 In 
its recent white paper on potential charters for fintech businesses, 
the OCC notes that special purpose banks are subject to the same 
laws, regulations, examination, reporting requirements, and 
ongoing supervision as national banks.78 Additionally, state law 
applies to special purpose banks to the same extent as to national 
banks, and including limits on state visitorial authority.79 While the 
OCC is the primary federal regulator, all national banks are 
required to be members of the Federal Reserve System.80 If fintech 
companies were to become chartered national banks, statutes and 
regulations enforced by the Federal Reserve Board on member 
banks would also apply to fintech firms.81 The Bank Holding 
Company Act (“BHCA”) could also apply to a fintech company in 
                                                                                                         
U.S.C. § 1818 (2012) (termination of status as insured depository institution); 12 
C.F.R. § 225.145 (2017). 
 76 See Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36 at 54; see 12 
C.F.R. § 225.145 (2017). 
 77 Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36. See, e.g., 12 
CFR § 7.5002 (OCC regulation authorizing national banks to use electronic 
means to conduct activities they are otherwise authorized to conduct, subject to 
appropriate safety and soundness and compliance standards and conditions). 
 78 Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36. 
 79 Id. However, this second statement about state visitorial power may be less 
likely in light of Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 523, 
129 S. Ct. 2710, 2714 (2009). 
 80 See 12 U.S.C. § 222 (2012). 
 81 For example, the Federal Reserve Act imposes quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions on a member bank’s transactions with its affiliates. See 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 371c–371c-1 (2012). 
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the business of offering consumer financial products that has a 
corporate structure that includes parents and subsidiaries. 82 
Accordingly, the BCHA would apply “if [the parent company] 
controls a special purpose national bank that is a ‘bank’ for 
purposes of the BHCA—that is, the bank is FDIC—insured or 
accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans.” 83 
However, similar to credit card banks that were exempted from the 
BHC, fintech firms under a special purpose national bank charter 
could similarly be exempted.84 The OCC notes that other regulators 
such as the FDIC and CFPB may supervise national banks, which 
would work in tandem to regulate the special purpose bank.85 
Some industry bodies have voiced opposition to the OCC’s 
potential move to grant charters to fintech companies, with most 
complaints coming from the Conference of State Bank Supervisors 
(“CSBS”), an organization of state bank regulators.86 The CSBS 
argues to the OCC that Section 5.20(e)(1)(i) of the OCC’s 
chartering regulations “exceeds the statutory limits of the OCC’s 
chartering authority by authorizing the OCC to charter an 
                                                
 82 See Lawrence D. Kaplan et al., The OCC’s Proposed Fintech Charter: If It 
Walks Like a Bank and Quacks Like a Bank, It’s a Bank, PAUL HASTINGS (Dec. 
13, 2016) https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-
items/details/?id=2b1eeb69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded. 
 83 Michael Nonaka, OCC to Issue Special Purpose National Bank Charters to 
Fintech Companies, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REGULATION (Dec. 11, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/11/occ-
to-issue-special-purpose-national-bank-charters-to-fintech-companies/. 
 84 See Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, PL100-86, Sect. 101, 
August 10, 1987, 101 Stat 552 (exempting credit card banks from BHCA 
coverage); For a more in-depth discussion of the BHCA treatment of fintech 
firms chartered under a special purpose national bank charter, see Fannie Chen, 
Beyond FinTech: The OCC’s Special Purpose National Bank Charter, DAVIS 
POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/2016-12-
9_occs_special_purpose_national_bank_charter.pdf. 
 85 Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36, at 6–8. 
 86 Jim Kurtze, Statement by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors on 
Comptroller’s Announcement of New Federal Charters, CONFERENCE OF STATE 
BANK SUPERVISORS (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.csbs.org/news/press-
releases/pr2016/Pages/120216.aspx. 
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institution that engages exclusively in non-depository core banking 
functions—whether lending money and/or paying checks.” 87 
Additionally, the CSBS maintains that “the creation of a new 
charter type for an institution engaged exclusively in lending 
money or paying checks would massively preempt otherwise 
applicable State licensing and consumer protection laws,”88 which 
is a key benefit from the perspective of fintech firms. These 
arguments89 could signal the possibility of a legal challenge to any 
OCC attempt to grant charters to fintech companies, which could 
considerably delay any possibility of a charter being awarded to 
any interested fintech company. Any legal challenge could tie up 
the OCC in months or years of litigation, which would forestall or 
prevent the OCC’s rollout of an OCC charter and would leave 
fintech firms in an uncertain position while attempting to navigate 
a fragmented regulatory scheme. Additionally, the Trump 
administration will appoint a new Comptroller of the Currency in 
April 2017, and that individual may be more persuaded by the 
states’ rights argument.90 
                                                
 87 John W. Ryan, Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks, Proposed 
Rule; Docket ID OCC-2016-0017, CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS 
(Nov. 14, 2016), 
https://www.csbs.org/regulatory/policy/Documents/2016/CSBS%20Comment%
20Letter%20on%20OCC%20Receiverships%20for%20Uninsured%20National
%20Banks%20NPRM.pdf. At least one court has taken a similar position. See 
Independent Bankers Ass’n of America v. Conover, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22529, at *34 -36 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 1985) (IBAA v. Conover) (holding that an 
institution which does not engage in both accepting deposits and making loans 
cannot be chartered as a national bank because it would not be engaged in the 
“business of banking” within the meaning of the National Bank Act). 
 88  Ryan, supra note 87. 
 89 See, e.g., Joel Stashenko, NY Regulator Slams Plan for Federal Fintech 




 90  See Liz Hoffman et al., Steven Mnuchin’s OneWest Lieutenant Is 
Considered for Comptroller Job, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/steven-mnuchins-onewest-lieutenant-is-
considered-for-comptroller-job-1487208755. 
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III. THE CURRENT REGULATORY LANDSCAPE FOR FINTECH 
FIRMS 
Without the option to apply for a national charter, fintech firms 
that want to operate in different states across the country (to say 
nothing of international markets) are required to sort through both 
federal and state regulatory schemes. 91  While the dual-charter 
system usually allows for financial institutions to benefit from a 
coherent regulatory framework at one level or the other, fintech 
companies are forced to deal with regulations and laws at both 
levels.92 This complexity makes it difficult for fintech companies to 
create coherent policies and practices in short periods of time, 
especially given the limited budget or small size of many young 
fintech firms and the cost and complexity of creating those 
policies.93 Additionally, many of the applicable regulations were 
created before today’s Internet dependent world, which poses 
another obstacle for companies attempting to grow and scale 
products. Fintech firms have attempted to navigate this complex 
landscape through a variety of approaches, including bank 
partnerships, hiring senior ex-regulators, and utilizing new 
regulation technology tools. 94  This section will provide an 
overview of the ways fintech firms currently attempt to deal with 
                                                
 91 SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar recently observed that innovation in 
the U.S. is often hindered by a fragmented “alphabet soup” regulatory structure. 
Tom Zanki, SEC Chair Says Investors Need Info For Fintech To Flourish, LAW 
360 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/862229/sec-chair-says-
investors-need-info-for-fintech-to-flourish Piwowar also said that, “The great 
potential of fintech should not be hindered by our current regulatory structure.” 
Id. 
 92 See Brian Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, 
MERCATUS CTR., GEORGE MASON U. (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://www.mercatus.org/expert_commentary/why-state-state-fintech-
oversight-doesnt-work [hereinafter Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech 
Oversight Doesn’t Work]. 
 93 See id. (complying with state by state regulation is expensive and time 
consuming, and “a massive disadvantage to young companies trying to compete 
with incumbents”). 
 94 See generally Peter Rudegeair, Online Lender Avant Names Sheila Bair to 
Board, WALL STREET J., Apr. 1, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/online-
lender-avant-names-sheila-bair-to-board-1459503001. 
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regulatory issues, a more detailed analysis of the issues facing 
fintech firms and the financial industry as a whole, and conclude 
with an analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of the current 
regulatory landscape. 
A. Overview of Current Approaches to Regulatory Challenges 
Most fintech firms are startup companies funded by venture 
capital firms or other private funding options.95 Their goal is to 
innovate in a segment of the financial sector like peer-to-peer 
payments or lending. 96  However, this means that the teams 
attempting to create a regulatory compliance model for their 
companies are often small compared to the vast resources available 
to more traditional financial institutions.97 The current regulatory 
system requires varied approaches for the different industries in 
which the fintech companies exist. While financial technology 
includes everything from insurance to crowd funding, the majority 
of current regulatory concern seems focused on lending. 98 
Consumer advocates, in addition to federal and state regulators, are 
especially concerned about the potential for unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive lending practices that have been present in other 
industries.99 In the aftermath of Dodd-Frank, significant regulatory 
                                                
 95 See Vitas Argimon, The New Wave of Partnership Models Between Banks 
and Fintech Startups, CTR. FOR FIN. INCLUSION (Sept. 8, 2016), https://cfi-
blog.org/2016/09/08/the-new-wave-of-partnership-models-between-banks-and-
fintech-startups/. 
 96 Regulatory Guidance Regarding FinTech Products and Services, SULLIVAN 
& CROMWELL, LLP (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Regulatory_G
uidance_Regarding_ FinTech_Products_and_Services.pdf. 
 97 Nicholas Elliott, Where Fin-Tech is Struggling with Regulation, WALL 
STREET J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Nov. 24, 2015), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/11/24/where-fin-tech-is-
struggling-with-regulation/. 
 98 Id. 
 99 James Rufus Koren, Online Lenders Drawing More Scrutiny by Regulators, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-online-
lending-regulations-20160309-story.html. See James Rufus Koren, Toyota Will 
Compensate Black and Asian Borrowers to Settle Bias Investigation, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-toyota-settlement-
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loopholes were closed, but the legislation also significantly 
increased the compliance costs of financial institutions. 100 This 
increased regulatory scrutiny, combined with an already complex 
regulatory scheme has led fintech companies to seek a variety of 
solutions in order to maintain growth and remain competitive.101 
The most popular approach utilized by fintech firms involves 
joining forces with other banks and creating a cooperative 
agreement, sometimes referred to as a bank partnership.102 For 
example, Circle Internet Financial, a digital payment company, has 
been forced to team up with institutions like Barclays to provide 
accounts for its mobile app.103 While relationships like these may 
be less than ideal due to reliance on outside partners for business 
plan viability, “the bank partnership model has two big advantages 
if structured properly: (1) no lender licenses for the platform 
company and (2) interest may be charged uniformly nationwide at 
rates that may not be permitted for direct lenders.” 104  OCC 
regulations allow national banks “located in any state charge 
                                                                                                         
20160202-story.html (reporting that Toyota paid as much as $21.9 million to 
black and Asian borrowers who paid more for auto loans than whites). 
 100 See Bart van Liebergen, et al., Regtech in Financial Services: Solutions for 
Compliance and Reporting, INST. INT’L FIN. (Mar. 22, 2016), 
https://www.iif.com/publication/research-note/regtech-financial-services-
solutions-compliance-and-reporting. 
 101 See, e.g., Mike Whalen, Bank Partnership or Go It Alone?, GOODWIN 
PROCTER, LLP (Aug. 23, 2016), 
http://www.goodwinlaw.com/viewpoints/2016/08/08_23_16-bank-partnership-
or-go-it-alone (exploring bank partnerships as a potential solution for the risk 
posed by fintech companies acting as direct lenders). 
 102 Alessio Botta et al., New Partnership Models in Transaction Banking, 8 
MCKINSEY PAYMENTS 11 (May 2015), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/new-
partnership-models-in-transaction-banking. “Without national banking licenses, 
startups are forced either to team up with banks or scale back their ambitions.” 
Telis Demos and Rachel Witkowski, States to Feds: Back Off on New Fintech 
Bank Plan, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/articles/states-
to-feds-back-off-on-new-fintech-bank-plan-1484132401. 
 103 Witkowski & Demos, supra note 20. 
 104 Whalen, supra note 101. 
http://www.goodwinlaw.com/viewpoints/2016/08/08_23_16-bank-partnership-
or-go-it-alone. 
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interest at the maximum rate permitted to any state-chartered or 
licensed lending institution by the law of that state,” which is 
commonly known as interest rate exportation.105 Several different 
kinds of cooperative approaches exist, namely outsourcing 
partnerships in addition to investment and acquisition 
agreements. 106  Partnerships occur when banks outsource 
operations, either in part (also known as white-labeling) or in full, 
to a fintech startup that bears the regulatory risk.107 The opposite 
can also occur, like in the case of Circle Internet Financial, when 
the fintech firm takes advantage of the regulatory position of a 
bank. Sometimes banks use venture capital funds to encourage the 
development of financial technology, and invest or acquire fintech 
companies (or simply specific technologies or personnel).108 Lastly, 
some banks will innovate internally, by funding and building 
solutions that are integrated with their other operations.109 
While financial technology companies or banks may use these 
partnerships to gain access to new markets or continue expansion, 
the partnership agreements can also be established in order to 
protect existing relationships and customer bases. 110  These 
agreements allow banks to harmonize customer experiences and 
integrate platforms and processes, while dealing with the struggles 
that come with multiple regulatory regimes and the digitization of 
the financial services industry.111 While bank partnerships may 
seem less than optimal for fintech companies, the agreements 
create positive benefits for both sides of the transaction.112 Fintech 
                                                
 105 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(b) (2014) (authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2012)); see 
also 12 U.S.C. § 25b(f) (2012). 
 106  Argimon, supra note 95 (explaining specific kinds of cooperative 
partnership agreements). 
 107 See Botta et al., supra note 102. 
 108 Argimon, supra note 95. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Botta et al., supra note 102. 
 111 Id. 
 112  See Rob Nichols, Bank or No Bank, Fintech Must be Regulated, 
AMERICAN BANKER (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/bank-or-no-bank-fintech-must-be-
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operations give banks fast and iterative approaches to innovation, 
without the need to expend large amount of capital.113 On the other 
side of the relationship, banks deliver fintech firms access to large 
customer bases, important real-world infrastructure, and big data.114 
Both parties benefit from improved customer experiences and 
trust, while cutting costs and increasing revenue in many cases.115 
While bank partnerships have worked for some fintech firms, 
larger entities like Square, Inc. and Lending Club who may try to 
navigate the regulatory scheme themselves have argued “having to 
navigate multiple federal and state laws makes it hard for them to 
expand nationally.” 116  Others accuse fintech firms and other 
sharing economy companies like AirBnB and Uber of skirting 
long-standing regulations, 117  despite accommodations given by 
some governmental entities to allow such companies to continue 
operation outside historical regulatory frameworks. 118  Larger 
fintech companies have responded to increased regulatory scrutiny 
by hiring ex-regulators to serve in senior advisory positions,119 
which may provide valuable expertise as well as insight into 
                                                                                                         
regulated (“Both [banks and fintech firms] are looking for regulatory certainty 
and healthy cooperation — all to the good of our customers.”). 
 113  René Lacerte, Is 2017 The Year Bank-Fintech Partnerships Hit 
Product/Market Fit?, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2017), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2017/02/13/is-2017-the-year-
bank-fintech-partnerships-hit-productmarket-fit/#7fc9832a379f. 
 114 Id. 
 115  A study by Mayer Brown surveyed seventy UK financial services 
providers (including banks, insurers, and asset managers), and found that 87% of 
respondents were able to cut costs by working with fintech providers. 54% said 
that partnerships had boosted revenue, while 83% said that collaborations 
allowed respondents to refresh their branding. 54% of Incumbents Say Fintech 
Partnerships Have Boosted Revenue, BUS. INSIDER: BI INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 28, 
2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/54-of-incumbents-say-fintech-
partnerships-have-boosted-revenue-2016-11. 
 116 Stashenko, supra note 89. 
 117 Wall, supra note 5. 
 118 Brittany Wallman, Uber is Back in Broward County, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 
15, 2015, http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-uber-final-vote-
20151013-story.html. 
 119 See Rudegeair, supra note 94. 
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strategies to better navigate the regulatory landscape. For example, 
online lender SoFi brought on former Securities and Exchange 
Commission chairman Arthur Levitt.120 Former FDIC chair Sheila 
Bair joined the board of directors for another lending fintech firm, 
Avant.121 While bringing on ex-regulators may be viable for some 
larger fintech firms, other firms will need to look for other 
solutions to regulatory compliance. 
B. Regtech as a Potential Solution for Regulatory Compliance 
While larger companies may have the structure and funding to 
attract senior ex-regulators,122 smaller and medium size firms may 
find solutions in another sector of startup companies: regulation 
technology or “regtech.” 123 According to the Institute for 
International Finance, a research-oriented trade association in 
Washington, regtech is “the use of new technologies to solve 
regulatory and compliance requirements more effectively and 
efficiently.”124 Kari Larsen, a former regulator at the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, described regtech as “technological 
                                                
 120  SoFi Surpasses $4 Billion in Funded Loans and Adds Arthur Levitt, 
Former SEC Chairman, as Advisor, SOC. FIN., INC. (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://www.sofi.com/press/sofi-surpasses-4-billion-in-funded-loans-and-adds-
arthur-levitt-former-sec-chairman-as-advisor/. SoFi noted that “Levitt will 
provide strategic counsel to SoFi’s executive management team as the firm 
moves closer to its goal of becoming the primary financial services partner for 
members.” Id. 
 121 Rudegeair, supra note 94. Ms. Bair also remarked “[i]nnovation got a bad 
name because of some of the harmful innovations we saw during the sub-prime 
mortgage craze.” Id. While serving as the FDIC chair in 2010, the agency said 
that loans that Avant originated through WebBank, an FDIC-supervised bank in 
Salt Lake City, mislead consumers about the credit cards it had issued on behalf 
of another financial company. Id. WebBank eventually paid a $300,000 penalty 
and changed it business practices, but did not admit any wrongdoing. Id. 
 122 “Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers is a director 
at LendingClub Corp., and Raj Date, who used to be the deputy director of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, sits on the board of Prosper Marketplace 
Inc.” Rudegeair, supra note 94. 
 123 See Gregory Roberts, Fintech Spawns Regtech to Automate Compliance 
With Regulations, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 22, 2016), 
https://www.bna.com/fintech-spawns-regtech-n57982074535/. 
 124 van Liebergen, supra note 100. 
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advancement that assists those focused on compliance and 
regulatory-related activities in their professions.” 125  Regtech 
includes technologies like machine learning and artificial 
intelligence to help aggregate big-data, update compliance 
manuals, and even model risk for bank stress testing. 126  The 
industry would not be regulated like fintech firms that directly deal 
with finance, but regulators could assist “in the creation of 
common integrated standards.”127 Regtech tools can also be used to 
improve anti-money laundering and know-your-customer 
programs, as well as helping to prevent fraud and in-house 
violations. 128  Utilizing regtech and other partnerships could 
“becom[e] an essential element of any fintech start-up’s strategy,” 
thereby improving both the profitability and efficiency of those 
financial institutions.129 
While regtech shows promise as an industry, the barriers to 
implementation of regtech solutions are similar to those faced by 
fintech firms. Restrictions on the use of data set out by data 
privacy laws can curb the use or sharing of certain data or create 
unstandardized data that cannot be aggregated and analyzed 
automatically. 130  Protecting the security and confidentiality of 
clients’ data is crucial for any financial institution, especially those 
who are seeking to establish or improve customer trust. Similar to 
the fintech industry, regtech firms face duplicative and overlapping 
regulatory schemes making it difficult to effectively partner with 
                                                
 125 Roberts, supra note 49. Ms. Larson also noted that these technologies 
enable “easier, swifter, more complete, more efficient [monitoring of] 
compliance and regulatory obligations,” and that “[i]n her experience . . . 
regulators are receptive to regtech innovations.” Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127  Imran Gulamhuseinwala et al., Innovating with RegTech: Turning 
Regulatory Compliance Into a Competitive Advantage, ERNST & YOUNG 
GLOBAL LIMITED 7 (2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-
Innovating-with-RegTech/$FILE/EY-Innovating-with-RegTech.pdf. 
 128 Roberts, supra note 49. 
 129 Marika Vilen, Fintech Partnerships Vital for Start-up Success, THOMSON 
REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2017), https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/financial-risk/fintech-
innovation/fintech-partnerships-vital-start-success/. 
 130 van Liebergen, supra note 100, at 15. 
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banks.131 However, a more streamlined regulatory scheme, with 
consistent interpretation of requirements for data protection and 
privacy, would make it easier for regtech firms to operate and for 
financial institutions to benefit from potential partnerships.132 
Despite potential challenges, regtech solutions could help 
fintech companies—especially smaller firms—with the burden of 
complex regulatory compliance. Regtech will allow smaller 
disruptive fintech companies to assess regulatory overlaps and 
minimize differing interpretations of rules and regulations. 133 
Additionally, partnerships between regtech and fintech allow for 
more real-time regulation management enabling companies to 
adopt preemptive and proactive strategies for regulatory 
compliance.134 Not only would regtech solutions help fintech firms 
navigate the current regulatory landscape but they could also 
continue to assist fintech companies that seek a national charter, 
especially in regards to compliance and reporting obligations.135 
Regardless of the outcome of the OCC’s inquiry into national 
charters for fintech firms, both fintech firms and other financial 
institutions will benefit from the clarity and control regtech 
provides in dealing with the cumbersome and time-consuming 
nature of regulation compliance.136 
C. Challenges Created by the Current Landscape 
The current regulatory landscape requires fintech firms to 
navigate a fluctuating and overlapping mix of federal and state 
regulations.137 Without the benefit of preemption provided by a 
national charter,138 fintech companies currently have to comply 
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with different regulations in every state in which they want to 
operate.139 Attempting to maintain growth and compliance across 
multiple states poses multiple challenges due to expense, 
dependence on other financial institutions, and constantly 
fluctuating regulations.140 While some solutions exist to mitigate 
these challenges, 141 they still pose a major threat to the viability 
and success of the financial technology sector. 
The complicated regulatory landscape is unfriendly to fintech 
firms primarily because compliance is difficult and a burden on 
company time and resources.142 Receiving lender licenses from all 
the states can cost up to $500,000 and take over a year,143 which 
may be too high for many smaller startups to effectively afford. 
Many young companies may be unable to reach a point of viability 
or attract interest from outside investors before the costs of 
regulatory compliance doom the enterprise.144 These startups may 
instead be forced to expand launch windows and “internal 
compliance reviews while lawyers try to apply regulatory guidance 
from traditional financial services to new and disruptive 
technologies.”145 Even within a single regulatory agency, there may 
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be inconsistent guidance between regulations, rules, operating 
circulars, and policies, and as a result, fintech firms may have 
difficulty determining what guidance is controlling.146 Those same 
inconsistences make it increasingly burdensome for fintech 
companies simply to track changes in all fifty states and the federal 
government and, moreover, to adapt their products and services to 
fit those new requirements.147 
Aside from the regulatory mire, excitement about innovation 
has chilled in the aftermath of the financial crisis.148 Financial 
innovation was once viewed positively, as “new techniques and 
products made America’s financial system more resilient.” 149 
However, the more recent prevailing view is that innovations like 
securitization 150  exacerbated the financial crisis by “making 
instruments too complex to value” through concentration of value 
while spreading uncertainty over where toxic assets were 
located.151 This cautionary view has persisted and has even been 
                                                                                                         
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dd2b13d4-7cea-4ae1-8036-
4dcbb6364a43. 
 146 Nicholas Elliot, Where Fin-Tech is Struggling with Regulation, WALL 
STREET J. (Nov. 24, 2015, 1:28 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/11/24/where-fin-tech-is-
struggling-with-regulation/. 
 147 See Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, supra 
note 92. 
 148 See Felix Salmon, How Financial Innovation Causes Crisis, REUTERS 
NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 11, 2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2010/04/11/how-financial-innovation-causes-crises/. 
 149 Such Seething Brains, Such Shaping Fantasies, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25–Mar. 
2, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21548232 (“True, financial creativity 
is often put to unproductive ends—gaming capital regulations, for example—but 
it is also needed to solve genuinely big problems.”) [hereinafter Such Seething 
Brains, Such Shaping Fantasies]. 
 150 Securitization is the bundling of mortgages into securities that were sold to 
investors. This bundling of underlying assets diversified and dispersed risks, but 
may have also weakened lenders’ incentives to screen out bad borrowers and to 
renegotiate bad loans. Edward L. Glaeser, Debating the Securitization of 
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (July 27, 2010, 6:00 AM), 
https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/debating-the-securitization-of-
mortgages/?_r=0. 
 151 Such Seething Brains, Such Shaping Fantasies, supra note 149. 
386 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 359 
applied to innovations coming from financial technology 
companies.152 The introduction of new financial instruments and 
services poses a challenge for regulators and financial institutions 
alike. A lack of market history makes it difficult for the market and 
regulators to set benchmarks for the risk associated with new 
products or services. 153  While some senior regulators and 
politicians have expressed willingness to foster innovation and 
growth, 154  the current climate is not welcoming to expanding 
fintech services. 
The difficulties that the crypto-currency industry encounters 
serve as a perfect example of the dysfunction of the current state-
by-state compliance requirements. Companies that transmit virtual 
currency “typically have to first register as money transmitters in 
each jurisdiction they want to operate in and second create a single 
business model that complies with varying standards for factors 
like net worth, bonding, and investor due diligence.”155 In order to 
have the knowledge and resource to comply with the varied state 
requirements, fintech companies are forced to partner with 
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traditional banks, which threatens to stifle fintech companies by 
forcing them to rely too heavily on traditional banking 
institutions.156 According to Circle Chief Executive Jeremy Allaire, 
many fintech firms would welcome a federal banking charter, as it 
would take “a lot of the cost and complexity of working with many 
third parties out of the equation.”157 Federal regulators have grown 
increasingly concerned about these third-party relationships, and 
the inability to understand certain technical innovations only made 
it more difficult to police those relationships.158 
The inconsistencies and differences that exist among the states 
fracture the national market,159 which is extremely frustrating for 
companies whose ability to offer low margin products relies in part 
on their services being accessible to anyone with an internet 
connection.160 The need to simultaneously fulfill requirements in so 
many jurisdictions hampers fintech companies’ ability to innovate 
and grow.161 In addition, consumers who are pushed away from the 
mainstream financial system often seek less regulated, “alternative 
financial products that charge exorbitant fees.”162 This situation 
creates negative effects for both consumers and regulatory 
agencies concerned with money-laundering and other types of 
fraud.163 
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Lastly, state-by-state regulation means that firms forced to 
comply with the laws of one state “may not offer a particular 
product anywhere in response to one state’s ban, even if other 
states would welcome the product.” 164  As a result, lucrative 
markets like New York or California could “set the regulatory 
tone” for the rest of the country, assuming that a particular product 
was already approved in other states. This could deprive citizens of 
the ability to hold policymakers accountable for poor regulatory 
choices if they do not happen to live in a lucrative market.165 If 
lucrative markets are allowed to functionally dictate stringent 
requirements across the country, the overregulation could reduce 
the financial products available in small states.166 This outcome 
would reduce competition in those markets as well as ensure that 
unbanked consumers remain unbanked. 
D. Pros and Cons of the Current Regulatory Scheme 
The current system of regulatory schemes for fintech firms errs 
on the side of caution instead of promoting growth and fostering 
innovation. The system does allow for both companies and states 
to experiment and tinker with different regulations and supervisory 
schemes in order to find a good fit that matches consumer needs 
and safety requirements. 167  This system also provides more 
accountability for lawmakers who will have more direct 
accountability to the citizens of their own states.168 State agencies 
are, traditionally, geographically closer to the entities they 
regulate, but the lower number of institutions that they oversee 
means that more time and attention could be spent on ensuring that 
fintech firms receive the guidance and advice necessary to help 
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them thrive.169 However, since most fintech firms only have a 
physical presence in one or two locations, this benefit would only 
exist if firms established liaisons in each state. Traditionally, states 
also have higher standards for consumer protection, and state 
regulators have voiced concerns that a national charter could 
preempt state-level consumer protection laws.170 At the federal 
level, the CFPB currently adopts regulations regarding consumer 
finance and enforces federal consumer financial laws through legal 
action. 171  As noted before, the current legislative approach is 
fractured but places a high emphasis on financial stability and 
consumer protection and allows a more tailored approach.172 
Despite the numerous positive characteristics of the current 
scheme of regulation for fintech firms, there are a multitude of 
negative factors that create an environment that is ultimately 
hostile to emerging companies. The primary obstacle is the 
splintered nature of the current landscape, as companies are unable 
to find a clear set of rules by which to operate, and instead are 
forced to navigate fifty states-worth of regulations.173 The energy 
and time required to deal with the multitude of schemes pulls 
resources away from research and development. Those efforts 
could instead be devoted to creating new financial products and 
improving current ones, which would amplify the already positive 
impact of fintech firms. Some experts allege that some fintech 
firms have even decided that a lack of meaningful federal oversight 
means that it is more advantageous to ignore the rules and focus on 
growth instead.174 
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Access to internet-based financial solutions is also an important 
means of increasing financial inclusion, or allowing underserved 
communities to access lending and payment options that are not 
often offered by traditional banking services due to margins and 
risk.175 According to the World Bank’s Findex Database, which 
measures financial inclusion around the world, in 2014, two billion 
adults worldwide did not have a bank account. 176  Growth of 
account holders in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, has been credited to financial technology services like 
mobile-based peer-to-peer payment systems. 177  According to a 
study conducted by the Gates Foundation, the Better than Cash 
Alliance, and the World Bank, “broader access to and participation 
in the financial system can reduce income inequality, boost job 
creation, accelerate consumption, increase investments in human 
capital, and directly help poor people manage risk and absorb 
financial shocks.”178 The current restriction of access to internet-
based financial solutions is a large weakness of the current 
regulatory structure, and it limits the opportunity for the financial 
services to help under-developed regions of the United States. 
Lastly, the ability of single states in lucrative markets to “set 
the regulatory tone” for the rest of the country and to dominate the 
landscape with restrictive regulation is a major negative of the 
current regulatory scheme.179 Since it is impossible for fintech 
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companies to avoid these markets if they want to remain profitable, 
they are forced to tailor their products to those markets and deprive 
citizens in other states of the political autonomy to affect the 
policies and laws that affect their lives.180 Consequently, if two 
states’ regulations or policies are in conflict, financial technology 
companies may well be forced to choose a state to operate in if the 
cost of compliance in both is impossible. This challenge is 
enhanced by the mobile nature of many fintech tools, where 
products or services are not confined by a brick-and-mortar 
location, and instead move freely across state lines. 
In the past, some solutions have been proposed to combat the 
issue of the inconsistent nature of state-by-state regulation. One 
such example is section 203 of the Uniform Money Services Act,181 
which permits companies that have obtained a money transmission 
license under the act in one state to operate in other states that have 
enacted the same or similar legislation. Unfortunately, only five 
states have passed the legislation, which severely limits (and 
almost completely reduces) the effectiveness of the scheme.182 
Another potential solution proffered more recently is the 
“passporting”183 of state licenses. 184 This policy is already available 
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in the EU, but a U.K. fintech firm will likely need two licenses in 
order to passport after the completion of Brexit.185 While these 
solutions are proposals that would help alleviate many negative 
aspects of the current regulatory system, they would also remove 
the ability for states to implement protections that other states may 
decline to establish. Similar to the current system, single states 
with lucrative markets might dominate the landscape, which would 
not eliminate the political autonomy issue. 
On balance, the negative consequences of the current 
regulatory system combined with the unstoppable growth of the 
financial technology sector means that new solutions are needed to 
better serve and protect consumers, as well as encourage these 
emerging companies to continue their growth and job creation. The 
current regulatory landscape may have been a better fit for pre-
2007, when regulators already had a relationship with most 
financial institutions and could trust that they would handle 
innovation responsibly.186 However, the current iteration of the 
industry is comprised of both established players such as bankers, 
older fintech companies, and emerging players.187 As emerging 
players continue to expand rapidly in size, the current regulatory 
strategy of focusing on “too-big-to-fail” actors in order to prevent 
systematic threats to the industry needs to be adjusted. Regulators 
will have to work hard to identify non-traditional institutions that 
can go from “too-small-to-care” to “too-big-to-fail” in a matter of 
years,188 if not months.189 While all fintech companies are unlikely 
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to reach the “too-big-to-fail” level so quickly, “in an ever 
interconnected financial system, market size and systemic risk are 
not necessarily correlated. The Dow Jones flash crash in May 2010 
illustrated that smaller players can also become systemic.”190 The 
current regulatory landscape does allow for a balance of consumer 
protection and experimentation, but sacrifices financial inclusivity 
and innovation, a trade-off that could stand to be improved. 
IV. THE FUTURE FOR FINTECH: A NEW REGULATORY 
LANDSCAPE 
Today’s regulatory scheme simply lags behind other countries 
in the way innovation is regulated,191 despite initial attempts to 
implement regulatory sandboxes and other regulatory reforms. The 
President of the American Bankers Association, Rob Nichols, 
wrote: “Our regulators can learn much from Britain about how to 
stimulate new ideas from outside banking and to integrate them 
under a common set of regulatory expectations.”192 However, the 
future of fintech should not be a complex reorganization of the 
banking system that forgoes a focus on safety and soundness for a 
Wild West setting full of experimentation in search of exponential 
profits. Instead, reasonable reforms can be made to ensure that the 
proper regulatory authorities provide the necessary safeguards to 
contain the risk of innovation, without unnecessarily stifling it. The 
result could be a system where banks and other financial services 
incumbents partner with fintech firms to generate value, while 
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increasing financial inclusion and innovation without sacrificing 
stability or consumer protections. 
A. The OCC as the Primary Supervisor for Fintech Firms 
The creation of a special purpose charter for fintech companies 
would represent a drastic change from the current regulatory 
landscape that confronts fintech companies. A charter granted by 
the OCC would allow fintech companies to avoid the current maze 
of regulation through the pre-emption of many state-by-state 
requirements. 193  In exchange for having to seek state-by-state 
approval for many financial practices, fintech companies would 
instead be subject to a rigorous, multi-layered scheme of federal 
regulation that is likely stricter than, and possibly as complex as, 
the state-by-state system.194 This layered scheme means that the 
OCC would need to work in tandem with not only other federal 
regulators, but also with state authorities in some instances. 
However, in the words of the head of the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, Thomas Curry, “[i]t will be much better for the 
health of the federal banking system and everyone who relies on 
those institutions, if these companies enter the system through a 
clearly marked front gate, rather than through some back door.”195 
Some industry advocates have lauded the OCC’s recent plans, 
noting that special purpose charters would be an “elegant way to 
ensure that important prudential and consumer protection standards 
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are consistently maintained while allowing new entrants to bring 
valuable, innovative products to market.”196 
While the OCC is the primary supervisor of national banks, it 
shares some responsibilities with other federal and state agencies. 
Some of those responsibilities have shifted in the aftermath of 
Dodd-Frank and recent court decisions. For example, the OCC was 
once thought to have exclusive visitorial powers for national banks 
stemming from 12 U.S.C. § 484, an interpretation once solidified 
in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000. 197  This authority was challenged in 
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C.,198 and the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a state attorney general was allowed to bring suit 
against national banks to enforce non-preempted state laws.199 
While state regulators would need to sue in order to get access to 
info about internal operations of national banks, the decision did 
signal a slight weakening of the OCC’s power over national 
banks.200 In wake of the decision, some argued it could disrupt the 
“system of consistent nationwide banking regulation”201 that the 
OCC is tasked with providing. This disruption may make entry 
into the national banking field less attractive for potential entrants 
like fintech firms, but all that can be stated for sure is that the 
ruling created additional tension within the national banking 
system. 202  The ruling affirms that states regulatory authorities 
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maintain an important role in the policing of national banks.203 For 
example, state regulations regarding usury, or barring loans above 
certain interest rates, are a bulwark against abusive lending 
practices that often target vulnerable populations who do not have 
regular access to credit. 204  Regardless of other regulatory 
authorities, the OCC remains the primary supervisor of federal 
banks. It is responsible for monitoring, inspecting, and examining 
banks to ensure that they comply with applicable rules and 
regulations and operate in a safe and sound manner.205 
B. Other Agencies and Laws: Secondary Regulation 
The OCC functions as a day-to-day supervisor of national 
banks, but three other federal bodies serve to oversee financial 
activity at a higher level. First, the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) 
provides direct supervision of bank and financial holding 
companies,206 any non-banking subsidiary not directly regulated by 
another state or federal regulator, and state non-member banks.207 
In the context of a special national bank charter, the Fed would 
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 203 See Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 536, 129 S. Ct. at 2721 (state authorities can bring 
lawsuits to enforce state law against national banks, acting in the role of 
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 204 Witkowski & Demos, supra note 20. 
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INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES, https://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_5.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
 206 A bank holding company (“BHC”) is a corporate structure used to control 
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(“FHC”) is a BHC that through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 can 
engage in additional activities such as securities underwriting, insurance 
underwriting, and insurance agency activities. THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 
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https://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_5.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
 207 See Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies, BOARD 
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holding-companies#03d (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
APRIL 2017] More Sense than Money 397 
likely only interact with a fintech firm on the overarching policy 
level. Second, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) 
is a formal interagency body that includes federal and state 
regulators, as well as Fed representatives, and is tasked with 
identifying and responding to emerging threats to U.S. financial 
stability.208 It is unlikely that the FSOC would have cause to 
interact with fintech firms unless they grew exponentially in size or 
were so crucial to the interconnection of financial institutions that 
their failure would threaten the stability of the U.S. financial 
system.209 Lastly, the CFPB is a federal agency responsible for 
implementing and enforcing compliance with consumer finance 
laws, and overseeing financial products and services.210 
The OCC works in tandem with the FDIC, which is an 
independent agency created by Congress to insure deposits and 
examine some large banking institutions such as financial holding 
companies.211 While many of the banks that fintech companies 
partner with are national banks regulated by the OCC, the FDIC 
requires a separate application from the OCC’s chartering process 
in order to obtain deposit insurance. 212 “The FDIC requires a 
thorough, well-developed business plan that is ‘tailored to the 
institution’s size, complexity and risk profile’ and that ‘present[s] a 
sustainable franchise.’” 213  The FDIC serves as a secondary 
supervisor, especially for those institutions who deal in 
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marketplace lending, supplementing work done by the OCC.214 
Despite its secondary status, the FDIC has recently mentioned that 
the online lending activities may draw increased scrutiny, and that 
it may pursue enforcement actions if those activities generate too 
much risk.215 The FDIC has recently formed committees focused 
on the retail and wholesale applications of fintech, suggesting that 
the regulator intends to be more closely involved in supervising the 
institutions. 216  Regardless of the FDIC’s final role in fintech 
supervision, their involvement creates another element that fintech 
businesses will have to consider. 
An important piece of legislation that fintechs may encounter is 
the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”).217 The CRA’s 
purpose is “require each appropriate Federal financial supervisory 
agency to use its authority when examining financial institutions, 
to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the 
local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the 
safe and sound operation of such institutions.”218 The law is limited 
to depository intuitions, but according to an OCC spokesperson, 
“[t]he OCC has the ability to condition approvals (of nonbank 
charters) to require compliance and activities consistent with laws 
                                                
 214 “Online marketplace lending refers to the segment of the financial services 
industry that uses investment capital and data-driven online platforms to lend 
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its authority when examining financial institutions, to encourage such 
institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they 
are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions”). 
 218 See 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2012). 
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like the CRA . . . .”219 However, a key provision in the CRA means 
that it applies to a certain geographic area, which may require 
fintech banks to use “strategic plans” similar to those used by 
Internet banks with no physical branches.220 Some industry experts 
have asserted that this could serve as another barrier to entry for 
fintech firms considering national charters. 221  However some 
politicians argue that fintech companies could reinvigorate the 
CRA, and stimulate a new emphasis on financial inclusion.222 
Other prudential regulators, such as the CFPB and the FTC, 
could potentially impose additional regulation on fintech banks.223 
The CFPB was created by Dodd-Frank in 2010 as an independent 
regulatory agency with rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement 
authority over nearly all firms involved in consumer financial 
services, irrespective of their particular legal form.224 The CFPB, 
which “aims to make consumer financial markets work for 
consumers and responsible providers,” recently announced a policy 
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where bureau staff is allowed to issue no-action letters to 
applicants with proposals for innovative financial products.225 The 
CFPB plays an important role in the oversight of consumer 
protection regulations, but the agencies’ role could be reduced by 
the current Republican administration that has accused the agency 
of overreaching its authority.226 If the CFPB were forced to reduce 
its activities, it would create a prime opportunity for state 
regulators to reassert themselves and fill the role of protecting 
consumers. 227  The FTC is likely to fill gaps in the federal 
regulatory scheme, but could also deploy its powerful law 
enforcement tools in its new focus on consumer protection risks in 
the fintech industry.228 
Lastly, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
could make further adjustments to its crowdfunding regulations, 
which would affect many fintech firms whose funds come from 
varied sources. 229  The SEC’s mission is to oversee “the key 
participants in the securities world, including securities exchanges, 
securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors, and mutual 
funds. Here, the SEC is concerned primarily with promoting the 
disclosure of important market-related information, maintaining 
fair dealing, and protecting against fraud.”230 The SEC has also 
seen an opening to regulate fintech firms, with Commissioner 
Michael Piwowar stating that “[he] believe[s] the commission 
should take the lead regulatory role in the fintech space.”231 Many 
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fintech firms are already registered with the SEC in a variety of 
capacities and are familiar with the agency.232 The SEC already 
seeks to “ensure that marketplace lending investors are given 
enough information to make good investment decisions,” and 
could regulate fintech firms that operate in marketplace lending.233 
This position conflicts with the OCC’s stance on the matter, but 
many fintech firms are already registered with the SEC in a variety 
of capacities.234 The SEC argues that their agency has a role to play 
in regulating marketplace lending and firms that use distributed 
ledgers to facilitate financial transactions, as well as those who use 
automated investment advisors to give disclosures to clients.235 The 
OCC’s chartering authority may ensure that some fintech firms fall 
under its purview, but it seems clear that the SEC will have at least 
some role in fintech’s future. 
C. Pros and Cons of a New Landscape 
Despite the complexity that may come with fintech firms being 
granted special purpose charters, the potential benefits to the 
banking system, potential entrants, and consumers far outweigh 
any potential negative effects. A primary benefit of granting 
fintech firms access to the national regulatory scheme would be 
increased competition with older, more established financial 
firms. 236  While some fintech firms perceive competition with 
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traditional institutions as a core mission, 237  some of those 
traditional institutions (and many others) argue that more benefit 
could be derived from cooperation between the two industries.238A 
single license would make it easier for many companies to do 
business,239 while those who did not want to seek a national charter 
could stick with the current system. Those who forgo the current 
system could still take advantage of potential developments 
regarding passporting and regtech, especially if they are smaller 
companies who could not afford the costs of a national bank 
charter. While this dual national charter and state-by-state 
approach seems counter to the idea of a consistent regulatory 
scheme, the dual-regulation scheme has been a “hallmark of 
cooperative federalism.”240 The larger, established companies who 
arguably are most in need of a more structured regulatory scheme 
could voluntarily apply for a charter, while smaller firms could 
take advantage of the state-by-state approach. Fintech firms 
specializing in payment processing could avoid partnerships with 
existing national banks, and instead divert the funds expended on 
that enterprise for growth and expansion. The OCC’s previous 
experience in regulating risky companies and dealing with 
systemic risk would serve it well in dealing with fintech firms, and 
it could even “leverag[e] the work of the National Risk 
Committee”241 to augment their experience.242 
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Recently, legislatures across the world 243  have begun to 
introduce a system where fintech companies could “work 
alongside a regulator when testing a fintech product or service.”244 
These systems termed “regulatory sandboxes,” and give firms a 
place to test new products or business models without the need for 
completing the full regulatory process.245 The sandboxes often 
allow innovative business to operate exempt from some rules, after 
being vetted by regulators. 246 Globally, sandboxes vary in the 
amount of leeway given to fintech firms, with some countries like 
Hong Kong only allowing banks who utilize fintech to 
participate.247 Other countries like Singapore, Australia, and Britain 
have established incubators that encourage more fintech firms, 
including startups, to experiment.248 Some U.S. politicians like 
Rep. Patrick McHenry (R., N.C.) have pushed for a regulatory 
sandbox option in order to prevent fintech firms from finding more 
attractive regulatory environments overseas.249 However, detractors 
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argue that a sandbox would only add to a fragmented regulatory 
system if multiple government agencies each had their own 
innovation office.250 While little progress has currently made in 
establishing a fully realized sandbox in the U.S., some federal 
regulators, like the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s 
(“CFTC”) acting chair, have signaled an interest in establishing the 
regulatory framework.251 Thomas Curry, current Comptroller of the 
Currency, hasn’t wholly embraced the sandbox approach, recently 
stating that, “we are not talking about giving you a carte blanche, 
get-out-of-jail-free card in terms of consumer products that may 
result in harm to individual consumers.”252 He did indicate that the 
OCC’s Office of Innovation would work with firms to vet product 
and technology ideas “in a controlled setting” to limit potential 
liability.253 The office will allow the OCC and banks it already 
supervises to experiment with new technology before it hits the 
market, and understand how a new product interacts with “existing 
regulations and implications to the safety and soundness of 
banks.”254 While this may be a step in the right direction, it seems 
for now that a fully realized fintech sandbox is not in the cards, and 
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instead government agencies like the OCC will experiment with a 
more restrictive version of a sandbox. 
In summary, this new system would strike a balance between 
“encouraging innovation while extending traditional protections to 
new financial products that have boomed since the financial 
crisis.”255 Despite concerns voiced by state-level regulators, a new 
system of regulation could ensure that state-level consumer 
protection laws are not pre-empted, which would create better 
protection of consumers due to the overlay of state and federal 
protection. 256  However, it would still be important that states 
attempt to institute reforms of their own in order to make a non-
national charter option friendlier to growing fintech firms. As 
mentioned previously, important reforms would include 
passporting and potentially regulatory sandboxes, which would 
help make the state-by-state option more viable for smaller 
companies.257 Lastly, as mentioned previously, fintech companies 
have incredible potential to expand access to credit and help reach 
underserved and unbanked populations.258 
Creating a new regulatory scheme may have overwhelming 
positive effects, but there would undoubtedly be negative 
repercussions. State-level regulators have been quick to point out 
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that the OCC’s unilateral decision to consider national bank 
charters for fintech firms is absent statutory authorization. 259 
Additionally, the same regulators have voiced concerns that “the 
creation of a federal charter for fintech or other nonbanking 
companies would put the OCC in the position of picking winners 
and losers among providers of fintech services, to the general 
detriment of customers and innovative financial services 
providers.”260 Despite assurances to the contrary, the creation of a 
federal system could preempt state consumer protection laws, like 
the ones that served to combat predatory lending261 in the absence 
of a comparable federal scheme leading up to the 2008 financial 
crisis.262 Additionally, the OCC’s creation of new charter types 
could violate the traditional separation of banking and commerce263 
and predispose the financial system to another catastrophic 
depression, this time precipitated by risk-seeking, growth-oriented 
companies. Finally, the granting of a charter to fintech firms could 
adversely affect full service banks who franchise their charters for 
programs managed by nonbank fintech companies and state 
banking departments who depend on revenue from regulated 
institutions. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the point in the future when fintech companies 
gain the ability to apply for national charters, the industry will 
continue to innovate, grow, and disrupt traditional financial fields. 
Millennials, an increasingly large part of the population, will 
continue to rely on internet-based banking options for peer-to-peer 
payments, loans, and wealth management. While a national charter 
for fintech companies may have some drawbacks, and may not be 
the best option for smaller companies, the increased regulation, 
uniformity, and transparency that come with the charter will 
benefit consumers and regulators alike. Our regulatory system 
needs to advance to accommodate an ever-increasing wave on 
companies who cannot be managed by the traditional geographic 
barriers that have long governed financial institution regulation. 
With a national special purpose charter option, companies will 
be able to continue to innovate and create new financial products 
that increase competition and deliver better rates and services to 
consumers, all while being supported by a robust regulatory 
structure that will ensure these companies do not endanger their 
customers’ funds or the financial system. The grant of special 
purpose charters places fintech companies on a more equal playing 
field with traditional banking entities, many of whom are 
attempting to respond to the increased competition by investing in 
fintech products themselves. Despite the battle lines already being 
drawn by state banking regulators due to their financial interest in 
continuing to regulate fintech firms, and the flurry of lawsuits that 
are sure to follow, the OCC’s decision to potentially issue national 
bank charters to fintech companies is the correct choice for fintech 
companies, consumers, and the financial industry as a whole. 
The decision to grant national charters should not focus on the 
economics of the situation, or the threat that fintech firms may 
pose to traditional banking institutions. Fintech is a growing 
industry, and the United States should seize the opportunity to lead 
the development of a new, job-creating industry. While the recent 
change in administration could signal “a real possibility for a 
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significant overhaul of financial services regulation,”264 there is still 
hope that federal regulators will be able to move forward with 
plans to incorporate the fintech industry into the financial 
landscape. The decision to grant a national charter to fintech 
companies is about what makes the most sense for consumer 
protection, competition in the marketplace, cost-saving for 
traditional players, and regulators. The recent step taken by the 
OCC in explaining how it would apply licensing standards and 
requirements in existing regulations to fintech companies is a 
promising one, 265  and indicates that momentum behind the 
proposal is substantial. Hopefully, the financial services 
community and the new administration will embrace the sensible 
choice over specific financial interests. 
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